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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, I 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 860325 
v. : 
HENRY S. BRUCE, JR., : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
This appeal is from a conviction of aggravated robbery, 
a first degree felony, in the Third Judicial District Court. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under UTAH CODE 
ANN. S 78-2-2(3) (h) (1987). 
£l'&T£MENT_QF_155yES_PRESENTED^N_APPEAL 
The following issues are presented in this appeal: 
1. Did the trial court properly refuse to suppress 
evidence seized as a result of the stop and subsequent arrest of 
defendant? 
2. Did the trial court properly refuse to suppress the 
identification testimony of Otficer Merrick? 
3. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's 
request that his prior convictions be ruled inadmissible for 
impeachment? 
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
refusing to give defendant's requested eyewitness identification 
instruction? 
5. Did the evidence presented at trial support only a 
conviction of robbery, as opposed to aggravated robbery? 
Defendant, Henry S. Bruce, Jr., was charged with 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of UTAH 
CODE ANN. S 76-6-302(1)(a) (1978) (R. 24). After a jury trial, 
defendant was convicted of the charged offense (R. 132). The 
court then sentenced him to a term of five years to life in the 
Utah State Prison, that sentence to run concurrently with a prior 
sentence (R. 136)• 
A recitation of the facts beyond that which appears in 
defendant's brief is unnecessary to the resolution of the issues 
presented on appeal. However, some clarification of Officer 
Merrick's testimony is required. 
With respect to Officer Merrick's testimony, defendant 
states: 
During the time the two men were moving 
around and he [Merrick] could only see a 
frontal view part of the time (R. 49). He 
[MerrickJ testified that he recognized Otis 
Latham by name but did not recognize the 
other man (R. 262-65). Upon returning to 
work the following day, Officer Merrick went 
to the docket sheet, found the name of Otis 
Latham and saw that Henry Bruce was the 
person arrested with Latham. He then went to 
Mr. Bruce's arrest file, looked at the single 
photo inside and concluded that the man in 
the photo was the man at the phone booth the 
day before (R. 266-74, 494). 
Br. of App. at 6. This partial summary of Merrick's testimony 
could leave the impression that Merrick did not recognize 
defendant as the person at the phone booth until he had pulled 
defendant's photograph from the arrest file. At both the 
pretrial hearing on defendant's motions and the trial, Merrick 
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testified that he recognized defendant when he observed him at 
the phone booth, but that he did not recall defendant's name (R. 
264, 488). Retrieval of defendant's photograph from the arrest 
file merely allowed Merrick to put a name to the face that he had 
seen (R. 266-67)• 
Because defendant failed to preserve for appeal the 
issue now raised concerning the admissibility of evidence seized 
by police officers pursuant to their stop of and subsequent 
arrest of defendant, the Court should decline to address the 
issue. State, v,. Lesley. 672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983). 
Furthermore, defendant has not shown tftat admission of the 
challenged evidence, if error, was prejudicial error. 
Under ££ai£_*jLJBiancll9 743 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1987), the 
trial court did not err in admitting the identification testimony 
of Otficer Merrick. 
The trial court correctly considered itself bound by 
State Y,t_Cintrgn» 680 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 1984), in refusing to 
suppress defendant's prior convictions of attempted burglary and 
theft as impeachment evidence. 
Under a long line of cases from this Court, the lower 
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give 
defendant's requested eyewitness identfication instruction. 
Finally, defendant is entitled to have his aggravated 
robbery conviction reduced to one for robbery under ptate v. 
SiiniYiilfif 741 P.2d 961 (Utah 1987). 
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DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE FOR APPEAL THE 
ISSUE NOW RAISED CONCERNING EVIDENCE SEIZED 
AS A RESULT OF THE STOP AND SUBSEQUENT ARREST 
OF DEFENDANT. 
Defendant argues that he is entitled to reversal of his 
conviction because the trial court refused to suppress evidence 
seized as a result of the stop and subsequent arrest of him by 
the police. However, he did not preserve this issue for appeal. 
In the lower court, he made only a pretrial motion to suppress 
the challenged evidence (R. 49-50); he failed to make any 
objection to the introduction of that evidence at trial (R. 439, 
456, 462, 495-96). Indeed, he specifically stated that he had 
"no objection" to the admission of most of the evidence (R. 439, 
456, 462, 496). In £iai£_ii._LS£l£y, 672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983), 
this Court made clear that, in order to preserve for appeal a 
challenge to the admission of evidence, a defendant must object 
to the evidence at trial, even though a pretrial motion to 
suppress has been made and denied.1 £$£ alSQ 5iai£_^jL«£l5yr 717 
P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986) (citing Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1)); 
£lAJb£_2*_££Jin££££* 699 P.2d 738, 740 (Utah 1985); £iflJte_yx 
J9£l¥J&aJS# 743 P.2d 791, 792 (Utah App. 1987); Utah R. Evid. 
103(a)(1). 
* Although Lfifilfiy was decided under former Utah R. Evid. 4 , the 
a n a l y s i s does not d i f f er under current Utah R. Evid. 1 0 3 ( a ) ( 1 ) . 
£&e State v. Jensen, 727 P.2d 201, 203 (Utah 1986); S ta te v . 
Holyoak, 743 P.2d 791 , 792 n. 1 (Utah App. 1987) . 
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Furthermore, although the trial court's ruling on the 
suppression motion appears to be sustainable under the pertinent 
case law, £££ l£iix_JijL„QhiQr 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (reasonable 
suspicion standard for investigatory stop); £iai£_.YjL_BlflD£])r 743 
P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1987) ("In the absence of clear error, we 
uphold a trial judge's factual assessment underlying a decision 
to grant or deny a suppression motion."); gifl±JL.XA_Mll£i£Il]l3ll, 70 
Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 19, P.2d , (Utah 1987) ("We will 
not reverse a ruling on admissibility [of evidence] unless the 
ruling created a likelihood of injustice."); gtfl tS_v^_HgUjSgJ r 669 
P.2d 437, 439 (Utah 1983) (trial judge is in the best position to 
determine reasonableness of police conduct under particular facts 
of case), even if it were assumed that the court's ruling was 
erroneous, defendant makes no effort to shoulder his burden on 
appeal of showing that he was substantially prejudiced by the 
admission of the challenged evidence. £££ 5_tatg_VjL_NigklS5* 728 
P.2d 123, 129 (Utah 1986) (citing StaAfi.-YA,PutCbJ5flDf 655 P.2d 
635 (Utah 1982)); Siajfcfi^^GllifID, 626 P.2d 478, 483 (Utah 1981) 
(Wilkins, J., concurring in the result) (holding that 
introduction of fruits of unlawful search arid seizure was 
harmless error, in that there was sufficient untainted evidence 
to sustain the defendants' convictions); Utah R. Evid. 103(a); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a) (UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-35-30(a) (1982)). 
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ECI1ELU 
THE TRIAL COURT1S RULING CONCERNING OFFICER 
MERRICK'S IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED FOR ESSENTIALLY THE SAME REASONS 
THAT A SIMILAR RULING WAS AFFIRMED IN £1&1JJ 
Unlike his assignment of error concerning the 
admissibility of evidence seized pursuant to the investigatory 
stop and subsequent arrest, defendant's claim that the trial 
court erroneously refused to suppress Otficer Merrick's 
identification testimony was preserved for appeal under £Lfcfi±JB_Yx 
ifiSlfiy* In addition to his pretrial motion to suppress (which 
was originally granted) (R. 62-63, 281-82), defendant 
specifically objected to Merrick's identification testimony at 
trial (R. 488). However, the trial court's admission of that 
evidence should be at tinned. 
With respect to Merrick's identification testimony, the 
court made the following ruling: 
The Court has some concern with regard to 
Mr. Merrick's testimony because his 
identification of the defendant may have 
allowed into evidence records of the Salt 
Lake County Jail, prior incarcerations, and 
that type of thing. And I think I was really 
concerned about that, that and other things. 
I have given this further consideration and 
read several cases on this particular 
question of identification. And, in fact, I 
have requested both counsel again to state 
their positions yesterday morning, last 
night, and I have given this a great deal of 
thought. 
I think, there is no question but we have 
here, we do have somewhat of an unusual 
situation, but we do have this officer who 
works for the Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Office. He works at the jail, who just 
happened to be in the area where he saw two 
individuals. He recognized one: Mr. Latham. 
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He knew Mr. Latham and knew who he was, and 
he recognized the other individual, had seen 
him before. And if I remember right, but did 
not know his name at that time, but had 
recognized him before. Based upon this, when 
he went to work the next day, he observed the 
booking sheet to notice Mr. Latham had been 
booked and therefore he checked on the other 
individual that was booked, and he took that 
name and went back to prior photographs of 
prior bookings. 
That booking itself. And he recognized 
that person as the person he had seen at the 
telephone. 
Now, the Court believes that what we have 
here is an officer who really, essentially, 
did police work, good police investigative 
work. He recognized someone, and he checked 
the record and recognized a photograph as 
being a certain individual. 
The Court doesnft feel that this fits 
within the dangers that the Supreme Court has 
been concerned about and there is nothing 
really suggestive. He really identified him 
in his mind the day before. It isn't like 
seeing someone that you don't redognize, but 
later on seeing one photograph and 
identifying him. This is an individual he 
knew by appearance and then he ascertained 
the name by checking photographs. So, the 
Court feels that it should allow this 
witness's testimony, but is only going to 
allow the State to go forward only to a 
certain degree with it. 
I am not as concerned about it being the 
very picture taken because the jury is 
already aware the defendant was arrested. I 
am concerned that nothing slip out about a 
prior incarceration in the jail, or being 
there the week before or having seen him many 
times before, or anything such as that 
because I think that would, could be 
prejudicial. If the defense pursues that, of 
course, that is up to the defense. But I am 
ordering the State not to pursue that and Mr# 
Merrick is here present. I am telling him 
and instructing him, I don't want that to 
slip out unless he is asked that on cross 
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examination by the defense. The defense may 
have a very good reason why they may [want] 
to go into that and I certainly cannot 
foreclose the defense from doing anything 
they need to do, from asking any questions 
they want to ask. So, they can do anything 
they want to do with that. 
I am stating, as far as the State is 
concerned, I am going to ask them to limit 
their testimony and you, Mr. Merrick, to 
limit your testimony as to what you saw there 
in regards to the telephone and your 
identification of Mr. Latham. And then, I 
will allow you, if you are able to identify 
whether or not the defendant, who is in the 
courtroom was the other man you saw at that 
time. And with that in mind, I think there 
should be no further reference to the Salt 
Lake County Jail. I think that if the 
defense wants to pursue further the fact that 
he obtained this photo, I think it has to 
be—they certainly ought to be able to 
establish that just because one is arrested 
and is photographed, tnat all people are 
photographed that are booked into the jail. 
Those that are later found guilty or 
innocent, so that that wonft in any way 
prejudice the defendant. Because that is 
certainly true, too. There are many people 
that are booked into the jail for numerous 
reasons whose photographs are taken. If you 
do go tnat far forward with it, that needs to 
be clarified. 
(R. 477-81). This ruling is sustainable against defendant's 
attack under &eil_JJU_£i3S£I.S# 409 U.S. 188 (1972), for 
essentially the same reasons the trial court's ruling was upheld 
in SJt£Lt£«yjt«BlflD£l)t 743 P.2d at 1188-89, against a similar 
attack. Defendant simply is unable to demonstrate that "the 
trial court so abused its discretion as to create a likelihood 
that injustice resulted." S£a££„X±„B2Xballr 710 P.2d 168, 169 
(Utah 1985). 
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THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANTS 
REQUEST THAT HIS PRIOR ATTEMPTED BURGLARY AND 
THEFT CONVICTIONS BE RULED INADMISSIBLE FOR 
IMPEACHMENT, 
Defendant argues that the trial cpurt should have 
suppressed his prior attempted burglary and theft convictions as 
impeachment evidence. Although defendant admitted to those prior 
convictions on direct examination (as a resplt of trial strategy) 
(R. 513), the State agrees with defendant that the claimed error 
is reviewable on appeal. £££ Stfltfi-YA^ggnt£Yr P.2d , Ut. 
Sup. Ct. No. 20185, slip op. at 5 (filed December 1, 1987). 
In ruling on the prior conviction question, the trial 
court noted that there is a split in the federal cases concerning 
the admissibility of prior burglary and theft convictions under 
Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2) (which is identical to Utah R. Evid. 
609(a)(2)),2 2Z£ bimst.r 39 ALR Fed. 570, 5$6-99 (1978 and Supp. 
1987), but correctly considered itself bound by this Courtfs 
2
 Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(2) states: 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness, 
evidence that he has been convicted of a 
crime shall be admitted if elicited from him 
or established by public record during cross-
examination but only if the crime . . . (2) 
involved dishonesty or false statement, 
regardless of the punishment. 
This Court has never construed Rule 609(a)(2); however, it has 
made clear that, in accordance with the intent of the advisory 
committee for Utah's new rules of evidence, it will "lookN to 
the interpretations of the federal rules by the federal courts to 
aid in interpreting the Utah rules." State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 
1325, 1333-34 (Utah 1986) (citing State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 
1316 (Utah 1986)). 
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ruling in Stt^tS^j^CintLQH# 680 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 1984) , that 
theft was a crime involving dishonesty under former Utah R. Evid. 
21 (a rule very similar to current Rule 609(a) (2)) .3 It had no 
reason to believe Rule 609(a)(2) had a meaning different from the 
similarly worded Rule 21. Indeed, this Court has relied on case 
law construing former rules of evidence in interpreting similarly 
worded provisions under the new rules of evidence. EJLSJL JStflfcg, VA 
IAS, 732 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 1987) (relying on case construing 
former Utah R. Evid. 4 in applying current Utah R. Evid. 
103(a)(1)); SJtfli£^ vx.Pi£i££r 722 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1986) 
(relying on cases interpreting former Utah R. Evid. 55 in 
applying current Utah R. Evid. 404(b)). 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
CAUTIONARY EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
INSTRUCTION. 
The trial court refused to give defendant's requested 
cautionary instruction on eyewitness identification which was 
modeled after the one recommended in ypi&giLSJfcfltgJg>Yj.^ TfllflAge» 
469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Defendant claims that this was 
reversible error. 
Prior to its recent opinion in State v. Long* 721 P.2d 
483 (Utah 1986), this Court had repeatedly held that special 
instructions on eyewitness identification ("XfilXaiue" 
3 Although it is not clear from the record, presumably 
defendants attempted burglary conviction was predicated upon 
intent to commit a thett. S&£ UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-6-202(1) 
(1978) . 
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whether t o g i v e lel£3iLS i n s t r u q t i o n s was d i s c r e t i o n a r y with the 
t r i a l c o u r t . j ^ g * S£ai£_y*_£££>&£!# 709 P.2d 3 4 2 , 346 (Utah 
1 9 8 5 ) ; S±A±£-XA_IU£]S£I r 709 P. 2d 3 1 3 , 316 (Utah 1 9 8 5 ) ; S t ^ t e vft 
BiDSliajPf 684 P.2d 4 3 , 45 (Utah 1 9 8 4 ) ; £iaJfc£_.Y.t._WaiSJM) r 684 P.2d 
3 9 , 40 (Utah 1 9 8 4 ) . Because d e f e n d a n t ' s c a s e was t r i e d p r i o r t o 
the Lfins d e c i s i o n , the old d i s c r e t i o n a r y s t a n d a r d , rather than 
the mandatory s tandard adopted for p r o s p e c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n in 
L£QSf 721 P.2d a t 4 9 2 , a p p l i e s t o d e f e n d a n t ' s c a s e . Under the 
d i s c r e t i o n a r y s t a n d a r d , the c i r c u m s t a n c e s of the e y e w i t n e s s 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s in d e f e n d a n t ' s c a s e , u n l i k e t h o s e i d e n t i f i e d in 
L2R9* 721 P.2d a t 4 8 7 - 8 8 , and g t a t e v . JQflag, 725 P.2d 1378 , 1381 
(Utah 1 9 8 6 ) , did not r e q u i r e the c o u r t to g i v e the c a u t i o n a r y 
i n s t r u c t i o n . This i s c o n s i s t e n t w i th d e c i s i o n s of t h i s Court in 
s i m i l a r c a s e s . JSxSx $tatfi^YJL_BIflDSl?r 743 P.2d a t 1 1 9 0 - 9 1 ; g£a£g 
XjL-££Ein3±Qn# 737 P.2d 1 6 8 , 169 -70 (Utah 1 9 8 7 ) ; Siaifi^yjt^NjgtfifiD, 
681 P.2d 833 (Utah 1 9 8 4 ) . £<g£ &lsQ jlfiHaSr 725 P.2d a t 1380-81 
(summarizing t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of e y e w i t n e s s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s in 
pre-Lai!3 c a s e s where t h e r e was no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n in not 
g i v i n g a Xsliaiue i n s t r u c t i o n ) . 
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO HAVE HIS CONVICTION 
REDUCED FROM AGGRAVATED ROBBERY TO ROBBERY 
UNDER Si'AI£_Jk.JSUHIYJLL£# 741 P.2d 961 (UTAH 
1 9 8 7 ) . 
Given the evidence presented in t h i s case , defendant i s 
e n t i t l e d to have h i s convict ion reduced from aggravated robbery 
to robbery for the same reasons the defendant was afforded that 
r e l i e f in £ifij;£_xA_£jii}iYiIl£, 741 P.2d 961 (Utah 1987) . 
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Based on the foregoing arguments, the Court should 
vacate defendant's aggravated robbery conviction, enter a 
conviction for robbery, and remand the case to the trialtcourt 
for resentencing, but in all other respects the trial courtfs 
rulings should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this _J_ day of December, 
1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON * 
Assistant Attorney General 
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